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1 Affirmative Action in India
1.1 Vertical Reservations
India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the
world since 1950. The affirmative action program has been implemented via a reservation
system. According to the reservation system, certain fractions of seats at government-
sponsored jobs and publicly funded educational institutions are reserved for members of
historically discriminated groups, namely Schedule Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and
Other Backward Classes (OBC). SC, ST, and OBS are referred to as the reserved categories.
People who do not belong to any of these categories are referred as to members of the General
Category (GC).
Some of the major initiatives for SC and ST reservations started in the late 1940s. In 1954,
the Ministry of Education suggested that 20 percent of seats should be reserved for the SC
and ST. It was specified in 1982 that 15 percent and 7.5 percent of seats in government jobs
and publicly funded educational institutions should be reserved for SC and ST, respectively.
The most controversial component of the reservation policy has been the OBC reservation,
mostly due to its size. In 1979, the Mandal Commission was established to evaluate the
situation of the socially and educationally backward classes. The commission used the data
from the 1931 census and estimated that 52 percent of the population qualified as OBC at
the time. In 1980, the commission recommended that 27 percent reservation should apply
to public sector entities. In the 1990s, the recommendation was implemented for Union
Government jobs. Up to 50 percent of seats at publicly funded schools and government jobs
are reserved for the members of SC, ST, and OBC. The remaining 50 percent of seats are
considered open category seats. Applicants from the GC have only been eligible to obtain
positions from this category.
The SC, ST, and OBC reservations were referred to as vertical reservations by the
Supreme Court of India (SCI) in its historic judgement in Indra Sawhney and others vs
Union of India,1 henceforth Indra Sawhney (1992). According to this judgement , not only
are certain fractions of seats at publicly funded schools and government jobs secured for
members of SC, ST, and OBC, but members of these reserved categories might also obtain
open category positions on the basis of merit. In current practices, applicants from SC, ST,
and OBC are first considered for open category positions. If they cannot secure an open
1The judgement is available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1363234/ (last accessed 12/10/2019). Sön-
mez and Yenmez (2019a,b) relates the legal framework starting with the Indra Sawhney (1992) judgement
to matching literature. The authors discuss and formulate legal disputes with respect to reservation system
from the matching theory perspective.
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category position, they are considered for their respective reserved category seats. When
a reserved category candidate obtains an open category seat, she is said to obtain it based
solely on merit. Seats taken from open category by SC, ST, and OBC applicants based solely
on merit are not counted against their vertical reservations.2
Being vertical reserve eligible by itself is not sufficient to be considered for reserved
seats. It also must be revealed by the applicant. Vertical reserve eligibility revelation is
optional. Applicants from SC, ST, and OBC are considered only for open category positions
if they do not reveal their vertical category membership. Allocation procedures according
to which revealing vertical category membership hurts applicants are against the philosophy
of affirmative action policies. Allocation procedures must give the correct incentives to
applicants to reveal their vertical reserve categories voluntarily. In the context of India, this
is not the case, because applicants can only submit their preferences over institutions. This
is not an issue for GC applicants, since they can only be assigned to open category positions.
However, a reserved category candidate might be assigned to the same institution in one of
two ways: either through an open category position or a reserved category position. Some,
if not all, reserved category applicants care about the way through which they are admitted.
It is very prevalent in India that reserve category applicants do not claim their backward
class statuses, and hence apply for positions as GC candidates. Evidence of this can be seen
in many court cases. The following quote from a recent case, Shilpa Sahebrao Kadam And
Another vs The State of Maharastra And ... (2019),3 illustrates this point:
“The petitioners contend that though they belong to reserved category, they have
filled in their application forms as a general category candidates and have not
claimed any benefit as a member belonging to reserved category.”
Stigma attached to the reservation policy is an important consideration for many reserve
category applicants. Pandey and Pandey (2018), for example, argue that students from
reserve categories are likely to face humiliation and harassment from their teachers and fellow
students. The authors report, from a survey at an IIT campus, that 13 percent of students
2With the One Hundred and Third Amendment of the Constitution of India, 10 percent of the seats
at publicly funded educational institutions and government jobs are reserved for the Economically Weaker
Section (EWS) of the GC. The EWS is a group of people who belong to the GC with an annual income less
than certain threshold. The status of EWS reservations was ambiguous in the Amendment. The government
later announced a memorandum in January, 2019, stating that an EWS reservation is a vertical reservation.
That is, members of the EWS might obtain open seats on the basis of merit and seats taken from the open
category by EWS applicants are not counted against their vertical reservations. Hence, in total, up to 60
percent of seats at each publicly funded educational institution and government job are reserved for members
of vertical reserved categories. The rest of the available positions are considered open category positions. See
Sönmez and Yenmez (2019b) for the details of the One Hundred and Third Amendment of the Constitution
of India.
3https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89017459/ (last accessed on 02/12/2020).
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in SC/ST caste categories felt teacher attitudes toward them were hostile. Moreover, they
report that 21 percent of students in SC/ST caste categories found the attitudes of fellow
students hostile compared to zero percent in the GC. Gudavarthy (2012) explains the stigma
as follows:
“The singularly debilitating limitation of the system of reservations in India
has been to increasingly produce a large number of social groups that suffer forms
of public humiliation, resentment and insult. The purpose of reservations to
provide the disadvantaged social groups a head start in realizing their potential
remains arrested and minimal, due to their inability to overcome the stigma that
is attached to such policies.”
Many reserve category candidates favor open category positions over reserve category posi-
tions due to the stigma. It might cause implementation issues when applicants are not able to
express their preferences over open-category and reserve category positions. In engineering
school admissions in India, for example, applicants submit their strict rankings of institu-
tions together with the reserve-eligible category they belong to. That is, each applicant is
asked to report
1. a ranking of institutions alone, and
2. a vertical category membership for which the individual is considered for reserve cate-
gory slots.
If an applicant does not declare a vertical category membership, then she will be considered
only for open category seats. Individuals who report their vertical category membership
in SC, ST, or OBC are first considered for open category seats. If they are not able to
obtain an open category position, they will then be considered for reserved positions in their
respective vertical reserve category. Optional vertical category revelation becomes critical
in this setting as it might create a channel for reserved category students to strategically
manipulate the system. To illustrate this point consider the following example. Suppose
an ST candidate who cares about the vertical type she is admitted under reports that she
prefers institution a over institution b. Suppose also that she reveals her ST membership.
Then, she will be considered for positions in the following order: (1) a under open category,
(2) a under ST, (3) b under open category, (4) b under ST. If she does not reveal her
vertical category membership, then submitting the same preference over a and b she will
be considered positions in the following order: (1) a under open category, (2) b under open
category.
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A similar issue arises in cadet-branch matching in the United States Military Academy
(USMA) (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013). In cadet-branch matching, each cadet is asked to
choose (1) a ranking of branches alone, and, (2) a number branches (possibly none) for which
the cadet is asked to sign a branch-of-choice contract.4 Then, using the branch preferences
along with the set of signed branch-of-choice contracts, a particular preference relation5
over branch-service time pairs is constructed to implement the DA algorithm. The DA
mechanism with respect to these constructed preferences is an indirect mechanism because
the strategy space available to cadets is not rich enough to express certain preferences over
branch-service time pairs. Sönmez and Switzer (2013) show that there may not be a weakly
dominant strategy that elicits branch preferences truthfully under this mechanism. The
authors argue that one cannot assume submitted branch preferences are necessarily truthful
under this mechanism. Moreover, they show that the difference between the strategy spaces
results in the DA mechanism losing most of the desirable properties.
Similarly, one cannot assume that submitted preferences over institutions are necessarily
truthful in admissions to publicly funded educational institutions and government-sponsored
jobs in India. The strategy space available to reserve category applicants is not large enough.
When applicants care about the vertical category they are admitted under, the DA mecha-
nism is not a direct mechanism if applicants are asked to choose (1) a ranking of institutions
alone, and, (2) a vertical category membership for which they are considered for reserve
category slots. The DA mechanism loses most of the desirable properties, if not all.
1.2 Horizontal Reservations
There are also special reservations that are referred to as horizontal reservations6 which
are enabled by Article 16(1) in the Indian Institution after the Supreme Court judgement in
Indra Sawhney (1992). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups,
such as women, disabled people, dependents of freedom fighters, children of deceased/disabled
4According to the Branch-of-Choice incentive program, a cadet may agree to serve three additional years
in exchange for increased priority in branches of their choice.
5The USMA mechanism assumes that each cadet prefers base year contract (with five years of service
requirement) over branch-of-choice contract (with eight years of service requirement) at branches she agrees
to sign branch-of-choice contracts in exchange for higher priorities. That is, if a cadet reports that she prefers
branch a over branch b and that she wants to sign branch-of-choice contracts with both branches, then the
USMA mechanism constructs the following proxy preference relation for this cadet: (1) branch a with base
year contract, (2) branch a with branch-of-choice contract, (3) branch b with base year contract, and (4)
branch b with branch-of-choice contract.
6While vertical reservations were studied by Aygün and Turhan (2018), joint implementation of vertical
and horizontal reservations in the context of Indian resource allocation problems from market design per-
spective was first studied by Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b). The authors formulate the implementation of
horizontal reservations mathematically by relating landmark Supreme Court decisons regarding reservation
policy in India to matching theory.
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soldiers, and people from hill areas. The implementation of horizontal reservations is quite
different than that of vertical reservations. According to the judgement in Indra Sawhney
(1992), these reservations are implemented as follows: when an individual who is eligible for
horizontal reservation obtains a seat without using this benefit, her seat is counted against
the horizontal reservations. It is also emphasized in the same judgement that if the allocation
is solely meritorious and satisfies the horizontal reservations, then no adjustment is made.
From the perspective of policy makers, there has been confusion regarding how to jointly
implement vertical and horizontal reservations. The judgement in Indra Sawhney (1992)
does not provide an exact procedure. This ambiguity led to widespread confusion and
many court cases. In 1995, the SCI provided a procedure in its judgement in Anil Kumar
Gupta Etc. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Others,7 henceforth Anil Kumar Gupta (1995).
The judgement in Anil Kumar Gupta (1995) has been the main reference with regard to
the joint implementation of vertical and horizontal reservations. The judgement clarifies
that horizontal reservations are to be implemented separately within each vertical category,
including the open category. We follow this judgement and model horizontal reservations to
be implemented separately within each vertical category. The particular procedure suggested
by this judgement has significant shortcomings. Our design of joint implementation for
vertical and horizontal reservations overcomes all of the shortcomings that the procedure in
Anil Kumar Gupta (1995) suffers from.
Horizontal reservations introduce both practical and theoretical challenges. The practical
challenges are due to the lack of well-defined procedures to implement horizontal reservations
when integrated with vertical reservations. The judgement in Anil Kumar Gupta (1995)
does not define a procedure when there are individuals in the applicant pool who belong to
multiple horizontal types. In the presence of applicants with multiple horizontal types, the
order in which horizontal reservation types are filled is consequential. The use of different
orders in different allocation processes has caused widespread confusion and many court
cases. The theoretical challenge is that horizontal reservations are not hierarchical. We
say that horizontal reservations are hierarchical if, for any pair of horizontal reservation
types, having one type implies having the other, or else no applicant has both of them
simultaneously.8 To see that horizontal reservations in India might not have this structure,
consider two types that are eligible for horizontal reservations: women and disabled people.
There might be women applicants who are not disabled, disabled applicants who are not
women, and applicants who are disabled women. When horizontal reservation structure is
7The judgement is available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1055016/ (last accessed on 11/23/2019).
This case and related many others and their implications on the implementations of horizontal reservations
are discussed in detail in Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b).
8The formal definition of hierarchical horizontal reservation constraints is given in Section 4.
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not hierarchical, it is straightforward to make it so.9 In our design, we consider horizontal
reservation structures that are hierarchical.
1.3 Sequential Admission Procedures in Practice
In India, admissions to publicly funded educational institutions and allocation of government
sponsored job positions are implemented sequentially. That is, positions are allocated in
multiple rounds spaced out over several months. There are two major reasons for sequential
processes to be implemented in practice.
1. The first one is due to de-reservations of vacant OBC seats. Even though vacant SC
and ST seats cannot be given to others, the situation is different for vacant OBC seats. In its
historic judgement in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2006), the SCI made the following decree that
makes it possible to revert vacant OBC seats to GC applicants for admissions to publicly
funded educational institutions:
“...Only non-creamy layer OBCs can avail of reservations in college admission,
and once they graduate from college they should no longer be eligible for post-
graduate reservation. 27% is the upper limit for OBC reservation. The gov-
ernment need not always provide the maximum limit. Reasonable cut off marks
should be so that standards of excellence are not greatly affected. The unfilled
seats should revert to the general category. . . Under such a scheme, whenever
non-creamy layer OBCs fail to fill the 27% reservation, the remaining seats would
revert to general category students.”
Even though SCI’s decision above suggests that vacant OBC seats would revert to GC
students, it does not provide a well-defined procedure to implement this. In all applications
where vacant OBC seats are transferred to GC students, a sequential procedure is used.
Admissions to technical universities were successfully reformed in 2015 pioneered by
Baswana, Chakrabarti, Chandran, Kanoria, and Patange (Baswana et al., 2018). Since
then, admissions to Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs) and other centrally funded tech-
nical institutions (non-IIT CFTIs) have been combined.10 In the beginning of the reform
process, one of the challenges for the new joint seat allocation process was the de-reservation
of vacant OBC seats. In their extensive analysis, Baswana et al. (2018) explain how they
solve the issue of OBC de-reservation as follows:
9See Footnote 25.
10See Baswana et al. (2018) for the details of the joint seat allocation algorithm and the reform process.
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“Our approach was remarkably simple: Run the core algorithm with no de-reservations
to completion. Move vacant seat capacity in each OBC virtual program to the
corresponding open virtual program. Rerun the core algorithm. Iterate until con-
vergence.”
In the solution of Baswana et al. (2018), positions are transferred from OBC to open category
that precedes OBC in the choice procedures of institutions. This approach might cause the
following issue: For a given application pool, there might be a set of SC/ST students who
are assigned to open category positions due to OBC de-reservations but would be assigned
SC/ST positions in the absence of OBC de-reservations. When the numbers of SC/ST
students in the applicant pool are low, some SC/ST positions might remain vacant. This is
because vacant SC/ST positions are not offered to others.
Unlike admissions to technical universities, in admissions to other publicly-funded ed-
ucational institutions and allocation of government sponsored jobs, additional rounds for
OBC de-reservations are implemented months later than the main round of admissions.
This means additional uncertainty and stress for applicants. Practically speaking, adding
another round of admission is costly both for candidates and the government. Moreover,
these sequential procedures may incentivize applicants to misreport their preferences. Both
theoretically and practically, there are great benefits to allocating all available positions in
a single round. Theoretically, it has been shown that sequential assignment procedures are
incompatible with equity and efficiency. In our design, all available positions are allocated
in a single round by carefully designing institutional choice rules that can also incorporate
OBC de-reservations.
2. There is also a commonly adapted sequential procedure in India that allocates posi-
tions in two stages due to high-performing reserve category candidates. In such procedures,
open category positions are tentatively filled in the first stage, and SC/ST/OBC positions
are filled in the second stage while reconsidering SC/ST/OBC candidates who received an
open category position in the first stage, i.e., meritorious reserve candidates. The tentative
allocation of open category positions causes problems. Since Sönmez and Yenmez (2019b)
address issues caused by such sequential procedures in detail, we do not provide additional
details here. However, it is important to note that our design overcomes these issues.
We model matching markets for publicly funded educational institutions and government
jobs in India as follows: There are individuals and institutions to be matched. Each institu-
tion initially reserves a certain number of its seats for individuals from SC, ST, and OBC.
Candidates from SC, ST, and OBC are able to obtain open category seats as well. The GC
applicants and reserved eligible SC, ST, and OBC candidates who do not declare their ver-
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tical categories are considered only for open category seats. When there is low demand from
SC and ST categories, their unfilled reserved seats remain vacant. With regard to vacancies
in OBC category, depending on the application, there are two possibilities: (1) Unfilled OBC
seats remains vacant in the case of low demand, or (2) Unfilled OBC seats are provided for
the use of others. At each institution, open category seats are filled first. Then, SC, ST, and
OBC positions are filled. In markets where vacant OBC seats are de-reserved, GC applicants
are considered after filling the SC, ST, and OBC seats. Each individual has a preference
over institution-category pairs.11 Individuals care not only about which institution they are
matched to but also about the category under which they are admitted.
We design a sub-choice function, Chier, that integrates meritocracy and hierarchical hor-
izontal reservations within a vertical category. Given a set of applicants who have the same
vertical category membership, the choice rule Chier selects applicants so that (i) horizontal
reservations are satisfied, and (ii) the “best” set of individuals with respect to merit scores
is selected among the set of individuals that satisfy the horizontal reservations. We define
a comparison criteria , merit-based domination12, to compare different choice rules on the
basis of merit. Our comparison criteria is an incomplete binary relation that makes domi-
nation comparison only when it is unambiguous. When horizontal reservation structure is
hierarchical, then choice rules that satisfy horizontal reservations can always be compared on
the basis of merit-based domination criteria we define. Therefore, for the resource allocation
problem we consider, our comparison criterion always make the necessary comparisons.
We, then, design institutional choice functions that take de-reservation policies into ac-
11There are three approaches to model reserve category applicants’ preferences. The first one is to define
reserve category applicants’ preferences only over institutions. Currently, in admissions to publicly funded
educational institutions and allocation of government-sponsored jobs in India, this approach is actually
implemented in practice. Even though it is assumed that applicants are indifferent between open-category
seats and reserve category seats, they are always considered for open category positions before reserved
category positions. This approach leads to incentive issues with regard to revealing caste membership and
preference submission over institutions when reserved category candidates also care about the type of seat
they receive. There might also be welfare consequences due to this specific tie-breaking rule in favor of
open-category positions. The second approach is to define preferences for institution and vertical category
pairs. This is the approach we take in this paper. The downside of this approach is that it might impose
additional constraints with respect to stability. This is because it requires every applicant to submit strict
preferences over institution-vertical category pairs while some reserve category applicants may truly be
indifferent between different categories of the same institution. However, we believe that imposing some
additional constraints with regard to stability is less of a concern than the incentive issues the first approach
causes. The first approach not only places a strategic manipulation burden on reserve category applicants,
it might also cause issues with regard to fairness and welfare. The third approach, which is a more general
modeling choice, is to model reserve category applicants’ preferences as weak preferences so that they are
allowed to report both strict preferences and indifferences. Seymour and Ertemel (2019) offer a model with
weak preferences and design a particular choice correspondence for institutions.
12This criterion was first introduced in the second chapter Aygün (2014). The current paper supersedes
this chapter.
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count. We propose three institutional choice functions, where each vertical category chooses
applicants according to its respective Chier, that differ with regard to de-reservation policy:
(1) without de-reservations, (2) vacant OBC seats are provided to GC applicants, and (3)
vacant OBC seats are provided to remaining applicants according to their merit scores.
We propose the COM with respect to the institutional choice functions we design as our
allocation mechanism. We do so because our design objectives for the allocation mechanism
are stability, strategy-proofness, and respect for improvements. Stability ensures that (1) no
individual is matched with an unacceptable institution-category pair, (2) institutional choices
are respected, and (3) no individual desires a seat at which she has a justified claim under a
given merit ranking and horizontal reservation structure. Strategy-proofness guarantees that
individuals can never game the allocation mechanism via preference manipulation. In our
framework, it also relieves individuals of the strategic manipulation burden, which involves
whether or not individuals declare their vertical and horizontal category memberships.13
Respect for improvements14 is an essential property in meritocratic systems. In allocation
mechanisms that respect improvements, students have no incentive to lower their standings in
schools’ priority rankings. For the matching problems we consider, respect for improvement
incentivizes individuals to report every horizontal reservation type they have.
We design matching mechanisms that:
• respect vertical reservations at each institution,
• respect horizontal reservations within each vertical category at each institution,
• respect merit scores to the extent possible,
• take OBC de-reservations into account,
• consider applicants’ preferences over both institutions and the category through which
they are admitted under.
We propose the COM with respect to institutional choice rules we design as the allocation
rule. We show that the COM is stable with respect to institutions’ choice rules, strategy-proof
for applicants, and respects improvements. Stability, strategy-proofness, and respecting
improvements have desirable normative implications for resource allocation problems in India
with vertical and horizontal reservations. Stability implies a form of fairness in the sense that
merit scores are respected to the extent possible under vertical and horizontal reservation
13Strategy-proofness ensures that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each student to report their vertical
category membership.
14See Kominers (2019) for detailed discussion of respect for improvements in matching markets.
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constraints, and OBC de-reservations. Strategy-proofness ensures not only that applicants
report their preferences over institution-category pairs truthfully but also that they report
their vertical category truthfully. Respect for improvement makes it a weakly dominant
strategy for applicants to report all of their horizontal types. Respect for improvements in
our setting also implies privilege monotonicity15 property of Aygün and Bó (2016).
2 Related Literature
First and foremost, this paper contributes to the literature on resource allocation problems
in India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints from the mechanism design per-
spective. Baswana et al. (2018) design and implement a centralized joint seat allocation
process for technical universities in India. Their centralized seat allocation process has been
implemented since 2015. Our model is different from theirs in that we consider individuals’
preferences over vertical categories as well, while their analysis takes individuals’ preferences
only over institutions. In their solution, they rerun the deferred acceptance algorithm mul-
tiple times to adjust OBC de-reservation, while we use simple capacity transfer schemes to
incorporate OBC de-reservation in a single run of the algorithm. Thakur (2018) studies the
allocation of government positions by the Union Public Service Commission in India. Unlike
our work, Thakur (2018) does not take horizontal reservations into account. The author
considers applicants’ preferences over institutions only as in Baswana et al. (2018).
Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b) formulate joint implementation of vertical and horizontal
reservations while Aygün and Turhan (2018) formulate vertical reservations only. Sönmez
and Yenmez (2019a) analyze the shortcomings of the choice procedure given in Anil Kumar
Gupta (1995), and provide an alternative choice rule. Sönmez and Yenmez (2019b) criticize
the widespread practice of tentative allocation of the open positions and offer an alternative
design. Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b) take individuals’ preferences only over institutions
while we argue that some reserve category candidates, if not all, do care about the category
through which they are admitted. The difference is crucial because reserve category students
who prefer open category seats might be able to manipulate the allocation mechanism by not
revealing their vertical category, when are asked to report their preferences only over institu-
15Privilege monotonicity suggests that when an applicant applies to an institution under a certain vertical
category, claiming an additional privilege (horizontal type in our setting) should not decrease her chance of
being accepted. As a result, when an applicant applies to an institution under a certain vertical category
that uses a sub-choice function with that property, it is always safe for her to claim all the horizontal types
she can. As indicated by Aygün and Bó (2016), this creates strategic simplicity for those applicants when
it comes to the decision of which horizontal types to claim. When sub-choice functions are not privilege
monotonic there are circumstances in which, in order to be accepted, the applicant should not claim some
horizontal types.
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tions. To solve this important issue, we model individuals’ preferences as strict preferences
over institution-seat category pairs. Moreover, our design takes OBC de-reservations into
account while Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b) do not consider the transfer of vacant OBC
seats.
Other notable papers on affirmative action and diversity constraints include Abdulka-
diroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiroğlu (2005), Kojima (2012), Hafalir et al. (2013),
Ehlers et al. (2014), Westkamp (2013), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Aygün and Bó (2016),
Kominers and Sönmez (2016), Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017), Nguyen and Vohra (2019),
and Avataneo and Turhan (2020) among others.
The matching problems we consider in this paper are special cases of the matching with
contracts model of Fleiner (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Important work on
matching with contracts include Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Aygün and Sönmez (2013),
Afacan (2017), Hatfield and Kominers (2019), and Hatfield et al. (2017, 2019), among
others.
The present paper technically builds on our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019),
that develops a theory of matching with generalized lexicographic choice rules. This theory
is built on the novel observability theory of Hatfield, Kominers, and Westkamp (2019). We
model institutions’ choice rules in the present paper as generalized lexicographic choice rules.
We model horizontal reservations as hierarchical constraints, which is similar to the lami-
nar families that have been studied in market design.16 Examples include Biro et al. (2010),
Kamada and Kojima (2015, 2017, 2018), Goto et al. (2017), and Kojima et al. (2018).
Moreover, Milgrom (2009) and Budish et al. (2013) study laminar families in auction and
indivisible object allocation settings, respectively.
Our paper is related to many other papers that study policy relevant real-world allo-
cation problems in different contexts. Some examples of such allocation problems include
refugee resettlement (Delacrétaz et al., 2016, Andersson, 2017, and Jones and Teytelboym),
assignment of arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013, and Schummer and Abizada, 2017),
course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver, 2010, Budish, 2011, and Budish and Cantillon, 2012),
and organ allocation and exchange (Roth et al., 2014, Ergin et al. 2017, 2020), among many
others.
16A family of sets is said to be laminar family if, for any pair of sets in this family, either they are disjoint
or one of them is a subset of the other. That is, the structure can be described as layers or a hierarchy.
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3 Matching with Contracts Model
There is a finite set of institutions S, i.e., publicly funded educational institutions or gov-
ernment jobs, depending on the application, and a finite set of individuals I, i.e., students
or job candidates, depending on the application. Institution s ∈ S has qs seats.
Vertical reservations. There are three designated communities whose members are eli-
gible for vertical reservations, V = {SC, ST,OBC}.17 Individuals who do not belong to a
vertical reserve eligible category are considered to be the members of the GC. We denote the
set of all vertical categories by T = {SC, ST,OBC,GC}. The correspondence t : I ⇒ T
denotes vertical reserve eligibility of individuals. That is, t(i) ⊆ T is the set of vertical
categories that individual i is eligible to claim. For every individual i ∈ I, GC ∈ t(i). That
is, every individual is a member of the GC. The correspondence t is such that for every pair
v, v
′ ∈ V such that v 6= v′ , we have t−1(v) ∩ t−1(v′) = ∅. That is, an individual can belong
to at most one category in V . Vertical reservations for ST, SC, and OBC categories are
implemented by setting aside a number of seats for each one of these categories. Let vSCs ,
vSTs , and vOBCs denote the number of seats that are set aside for SC, ST, and OBC categories
at institution s ∈ S, respectively. The vector vs = (vSCs , vSTs , vOBCs ) denotes the vector of
vertical reservations at institution s. Then, vOs = qs −
(
vSCs + v
ST
s + v
OBC
s
)
is the number
of open category seats. According to Indra Sawhney (1992), when SC/ST/OBC applicants
are assigned open category positions, these positions are not counted against their respective
vertical category.
Horizontal reservations. In addition to a vertical category membership, each individual
has a set of horizontal types. Let H = {h1, ..., h|H|} be the set of all horizontal types, i.e., h1
denotes being a woman, h2 denotes being disabled, etc. The correspondence ρ : I ⇒ H∪{h0}
represents individuals’ horizontal type eligibility. That is, ρ(i) ⊆ H∪{h0} denotes the set of
horizontal types that individual i can claim. If ρ(i) = h0, then individual i does not have any
horizontal type. Following the judgement in Anil Kumar Gupta (1995), we model horizontal
reservations so that they cut across vertical reservations. That is, horizontal reservations are
implemented at each vertical category, including the open category. At each vertical category
a certain minimum number of individuals for each horizontal type must be selected, whenever
17In some applications in India, vertical reservation groups are divided into sub-categories. OBC reser-
vations, for example, are divided into sub-categories. For notational simplicity, we model reserve categories
as SC, ST, and OBC only. The whole analysis can be straightforwardly extended to sub-categorization.
In January 2019, the Union Cabinet in India approved a 10% reservation of government jobs and educa-
tional institutions for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) in the GC. Our model and results can be
straightforwardly extended for any number of vertical categories.
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possible. We denote by hj(v,s) the number of reserved seats for horizontal type hj ∈ H at
vertical category v ∈ T in institution s ∈ S. We denote the vector of horizontal reservations
for institution s in vertical category v ∈ T by h(v,s) ≡ (h1(v,s), ..., h
|H|
(v,s). Let hs ≡
{
h(v,s)
}
v∈T
denote the horizontal reservations for institution s.
We say that horizontal reservations, h(v,s), are applicable for vertical category v in insti-
tution s if, for every set of individuals I ⊆ I, there exists a subset J ⊆ I such that
1. | J |≤ vvs ,
2. if J ∩ ρ−1(hj) < hj(v,s) implies (I \ J) ∩ ρ−1(hj) = ∅, for every hj ∈ H.
That is, horizontal reservations are applicable for vertical category v if the total capacity of
vertical category v and number of reserved positions in each horizontal type are respected.
We assume that horizontal reservations are applicable for all vertical categories at each
institution.
Merit scores. Each individual has a merit score at each institution. The function κ :
I ×S → R+ denotes individuals’ merit scores at institutions. We denote by κ(i, s) the merit
score of individual i at institution s. We assume that no two individuals have the same
score at a given institution.18 That is, for all i, j ∈ I and s ∈ S such that i 6= j, we have
κ(i, s) 6= κ(j, s). The function κ induces strict meritorious ranking of individuals at each
institution.
Contracts. We define X ≡ ∪
i∈I
i×S × t(i) as the set of all contracts. Each contract x ∈ X
is between an individual i(x) and an institution s(x) and specifies a vertical category t(x)
under which individual i(x) is admitted. There may be multiple contracts for each individual-
institution pair. We extend the notations i(·), s(·), and t(·) to the set of contracts, for any
X ⊆ X , by setting i(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{i(x)}, s(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{s(x)} and t(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{t(x)}. For X ⊆ X ,
we denote Xi ≡ {x ∈ X | i(x) = i}; analogously, we denote Xs ≡ {x ∈ X | s(x) = s}, and
Xt ≡ {x ∈ X | t(x) = t}.
Individuals’ preferences. We define individuals’ preferences over institutions and verti-
cal category pairs. That is, each individual i ∈ I reports a strict preference relation Pi over
18In current practices in India, when two or more applicants have the same score, ties are broken with
respect to some exogenously given objective criteria.
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(S × t(i)) ∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes the outside option.19 We write, for example,
(s, v)Pi(s
′
, v
′
)
to mean that admission to institution s through vertical category v is strictly preferred over
admission to institution s′ through vertical category v′ . The at-least-as-well relation Ri is
obtained from Pi as follows: (s, v)Ri(s
′
, v
′
) if and only if either (s, v)P i(s′ , v′) or (s, v) =
(s
′
, v
′
). An institution and vertical category pair (s, v) is acceptable to individual i if it is
at least as good as the null contract ∅, i.e., (s, v)Ri∅ and is unacceptable to her if it is worse
than the outside option ∅, i.e., ∅Pi(s, v). We assume that for all v ∈ V such that v /∈ t(i),
∅Pi(s, v) for all s ∈ S. Individuals have unit demand in the sense that they choose at most
one contract from a given set of contracts. For each individual i ∈ I and a set of pairs
X ⊆ S × t(i), the chosen set of individual i is defined as
Ci(X) ≡ max
Pi
X ∪ {∅}.
Institutions’ selection criteria. Institutions in India with multi-unit demand have com-
plicated selection procedures when vertical and horizontal reservations are jointly imple-
mented. In what follows, we describe institutions’ selection criteria via (overall) choice rules
that have been proven to be useful tools in matching markets with complex constraints. In
our context, a choice rule of an institution s ∈ S is a function Cs(· | qs, vs, hs), henceforth
Cs(·) for short, such that for any set of contracts X ⊆ X , number of available seats qs, vector
of vertical reservations vs, and vector of horizontal reservations hs,
Cs(X) ⊆ X such that | Cs(X) |≤ qs.
We incorporate vertical reservations, horizontal reservations within each vertical category,
respecting meritocracy, and de-reservation policies into institutions’ overall choice rules.
Furthermore, to comply with the spirit of the affirmative action and meritocracy, institutions’
overall choice rules need to satisfy the following natural fairness criterion.20
For a given set of contracts X ⊆ Xs, the chosen set of contracts Cs(X) is fair if i(x) /∈
i[Cs(X)], then for every y ∈ Cs(X) at least one of the following hold:
1. κ(i(y), s) > κ(i(x), s),
19We have not found any evidence that individuals care about the horizontal types under which they are
admitted. Therefore, we assume that individuals do not have preferences for horizontal types.
20The “fairness of a choice rule” criterion under affirmative action constraints was first introduced in Aygün
and Bó (2016) in the context of Brazilian college admissions where students have multidimensional privileges.
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2. t(x) 6= t(y),
3. t(x) = t(y) and ρ(i(x)) + ρ(i(y)).
That is, if all contracts of an individual are rejected, then chosen contracts must be associated
with individuals who either have higher merit scores or claim (set-wise) more affirmative
action characteristics (i.e., a combination of vertical reservation categories and horizontal
reservation types). We say that an overall choice rule Cs is fair if for any given set of
contracts X ⊆ X , Cs(X) is fair for institution s.
Matching
A matching is a set of contracts X ⊆ X . We restrict our attention to the matchings that
are feasible.
Feasibility. A matching X is feasible if
• there is at most one contract for each individual in X, i.e., | Xi |≤ 1 for each i ∈ I,
and
• there are at most qs contracts for each institution s in X, i.e., | Xs |≤ qs for each
s ∈ S.
We are interested in matchings that are fair in the following sense.21
Fairness. A feasible matching X ⊆ X is fair if, for any given pair contracts x, y ∈ X,
(s(y), t(y))Pi(x)(s(x), t(x)), then at least one of the following hold:
1. κ(i(y), s(y)) > κ(i(x), s(y)),
2. ρ(i(x)) + ρ(i(y)).
That is, a matching is fair if an individual envies assignment of another individual, then either
the former individual has a lower merit score at that institution or the latter individual has
horizontal reservation type that the former does not. Note that if (s(y), t(y))Pi(x)(s(x), t(x)),
then individual i(x) has vertical type t(y), as well.
In the context of admissions to publicly funded educational institutions and government-
sponsored jobs in India, this fairness criterion—that can be interpreted as respecting merit
scores to the extent possible—is crucial. It says that at each vertical category in every
21A similar notion of fairness is defined in Aygün and Bó (2016) in the context of Brazilian affirmative
action, where students have multidimensional privileges (types).
16
institution, an individual with a higher score is given higher priority than an individual with
lower score, unless the latter individual has some horizontal reservation types that the former
does not.
Stability. A feasible matching X ⊆ X is stable if it is
1. Individually rational: Cs(X) = Xs for all s ∈ S, and XiRi∅i for all i ∈ I.
2. Unblocked: There does not exist a nonempty Z ⊆ (X \X), such that Zs ⊆ Cs(X ∪Z)
for all s ∈ s(Z) and ZPiX for all i ∈ i(Z).
Individual rationality requires that each individual finds her assignment, i.e., an institution-
vertical category pair, acceptable. Individual rationality also requires that institutions’ se-
lection procedures are respected in the sense that when an institution is offered its set of
contracts, i.e., a set of pairs of individuals and vertical categories, it selects all of them. Un-
blockedness states that individuals and institutions cannot benefit by re-contracting outside
of the match.
Remark 1. Stability crucially depends on how institutions’ selection procedures are defined.
In admissions to publicly funded educational institutions and the allocation of government-
sponsored jobs in India, institutions’ selection criteria embody legal requirements such as
respect for vertical reservations, implementation of horizontal reservations within each verti-
cal category including the open category, respect for merit scores, and OBC de-reservations.
Stability, therefore, is a natural, desirable characteristic of an allocation. If each individual
applies to only one institution, stability requires that the rules and regulations encoded in
institutions’ choice rules determine which contracts (i.e., which individual-vertical category
pairs) are selected. Laws in India do not specify an exact procedure to determine the alloca-
tion of individuals to institutions when individuals apply to multiple institutions. Stability
presents a natural desiderata for an allocation: an individual will only be matched to a less
desirable institution if, by following the selection criteria of those institutions, she would
not be accepted given the individuals (with vertical and horizontal category membership)
who have been matched to these institutions. Unstable allocations, therefore, might lead to
lawsuits from dissatisfied applicants.
Stability with respect to fair choice rules does not imply fairness of a matching. Our first
result explains the relationship between fairness of a matching and stability with respect to
fair choice rules.22
22Romm, Roth, and Shorrer (2020) generalize the definition of justified envy in matching with contracts
environments and show that stable allocations might have justified envy. Our fairness definition for choice
rules is different than their definition of strong priority, but the two notions are related.
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Proposition 1. Fairness and stability with respect to fair choice rules are independent.
Proof. See Appendix D.
4 Designing Institutional Choices
To design choice rules for Indian institutions, we first note that the selection criteria must
take into account (1) vertical reservations, (2) horizontal reservations within each vertical
category, (3) respect for merit scores (in conjunction with satisfying horizontal reservations),
and (4) de-reservation schemes from OBC to other categories. We begin our analysis by
designing a sub-choice function to be implemented within each vertical category.
The sub-choice function of a vertical category must satisfy horizontal reservations and
take merit scores into account. In the absence of horizontal reservations, sub-choice functions
must be induced from merit scores. In the presence of horizontal reservations, we design a
particular sub-choice function23 that selects the best set of applicants with respect to a
criterion, merit-based domination , which we define in Section 4.1. This sub-choice function
minimally deviates from the meritorious outcome while satisfying horizontal reservations.
Before proceeding to the design of the aforementioned sub-choice function, we define a
specific horizontal reservation structure, hierarchy, that will be necessary for the existence
of stable outcomes. Even though in some applications in India horizontal reservations fail
to satisfy this condition, in many others they do.
Hierarchical structure of horizontal reservations. Horizontal reservation types are
hierarchical, if for any pair of horizontal types hj, hk ∈ H such that ρ−1(hj)∩ ρ−1(hk) 6= ∅,
either ρ−1(hj) ⊂ ρ−1(hk) or ρ−1(hk) ⊂ ρ−1(hj). We say that a horizontal reservation type
hj ∈ H contains hk ∈ H if, for every individual i ∈ I, hk ∈ ρ(i) implies hj ∈ ρ(i). That is,
ρ−1(hk) ⊂ ρ−1(hj).
We assume from now on that horizontal reserve structure is hierarchical.24
23This sub-choice function was introduced in the second chapter of Aygün (2014) and also in Aygün (2017).
The current paper subsumes and supersedes both of them.
24When horizontal reservations are not hierarchical, it is straightforward to make them hierarchical.
Given any two hierarchical types hj and hk that do not contain each other with non-empty intersection, the
following three horizontal types are constructed: (1) individuals with hj but not with hk, (2) individuals
with hk but not with hj , and (3) individuals with both hj and hk. If horizontal reservations for hj and hk
are given as fractions, then the reservation for the new type (3) is computed by multiplying the horizontal
reservations for hj and hk. Then, reservations for types (1) and (2) are computed in a straightforward
manner. This process can be repeated until there are no two horizontal types that do not contain each
other with non-empty intersection. An example of this can be seen in Brazilian college admission with
affirmative action. In Brazil, there are three horizontal types: public high school graduates, minorities,
and low income applicants. The reservations are expressed as fractions. In the guidelines announced
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4.1 Integrating Horizontal Reservations with Meritocracy
We denote by Csv(· | vvs , h(v,s)) a sub-choice function of vertical category v ∈ T in institution
s ∈ S, where vvs is number of positions vertically reserved for category v ∈ T and h(v,s) is the
vector of horizontal reservations at vertical category v. We use Csv to denote the sub-choice
function of vertical category v in institution s for short, if there is no confusion.
An attractive property of sub-choice functions is the ability to select as many alternative
as possible without exceeding the capacity, vvs . This is a commonly used property called
q-acceptance, where q denotes the capacity. Technically, a sub-choice rule Csv is q-acceptant
if for any set of contracts X ⊆ Xv,
| Csv(X) |≤ min{| X |, vvs},
where vvs is the capacity of vertical category v. That is, if the number of contract offers is
less or equal to the capacity of the vertical category v, Csv selects all of them. If the number
of alternatives is greater than the capacity of vertical category v, then it chooses as many
alternatives as capacity allows.
Horizontal reservations must be satisfied within each vertical category. Given a set of
contracts X ⊆ X , we say that Y ⊆ Xv satisfies the horizontal reservation for hj at
vertical category v, if i(Y ) ∩ ρ−1(hj) < hj(v,s) implies i(Xs \ Ys) ∩ ρ−1(hj) = ∅. That is,
if the number of individuals who have horizontal type hj in the set i(Y ) is less than or
equal to the number of positions reserved for horizontal type hj at vertical category v, h
j
(v,s),
then there must be no individual who have horizontal type hj in the set i(X \ Y ). We say
that Y ⊆ satisfies horizontal reservations if it satisfies horizontal reservations for all hj,
j = 1, ..., | H | at each vertical category v ∈ T .
Before introducing our sub-choice function that integrates horizontal reservations and
meritocracy, we first define a criterion upon which we compare different choice rules on the
basis of meritocracy.
Merit-based domination. We say that a set of individuals I merit-based dominates a
set of individuals J with | I |=| J |= n at institution s if there exists a bijection g : I −→ J
such that
1. for all i ∈ I, κ(i, s) ≥ κ(g(i), s), and,
2. there exists j ∈ I such that κ(j, s) > κ(g(j), s).
by the Brazilian government, seats at each program are partitioned for combinations (constructing new
types) of these three types and reservations are calculated by multiplying the fractions. For details, see
http://www.lex.com.br/legis_23866622_PORTARIA_NORMATIVA_N_18_DE_11_DE_OUTUBRO_DE_2012.aspx.
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We now extend the merit-based comparison criterion that compares sets to a merit-based
comparison criterion to compare q-acceptant choice rules. Consider q-acceptant sub-choice
rules C˜ and C. We say that C˜ merit-based dominates C if, for any set of contracts X ⊆ X ,
the set of individuals i(C˜(X)) merit-based dominates the set of individuals i(C(X)). That
is, the score of the highest scoring applicant in i(C˜(X)) is greater than or equal to the score
of the highest scoring applicant in i(C(X)), the score of the second highest scoring applicant
in i(C˜(X)) is greater than or equal to the score of the second highest scoring applicant in
i(C(X)), and so on and so forth. Moreover, there exists an integer l such that the score of
the lth highest scoring applicant in i(C˜(X)) is greater than or equal to the score of the lth
highest scoring applicant in i(C(X)).
Our domination relation does not induce a complete binary relation. It might be the
case that two choice rules are incomparable with regard to our domination criterion. To
illustrate this, consider the following example: Let q = 2 and I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}. Suppose
that individuals’ test scores are such that κ(i1) > κ(i2) > κ(i3) > κ(i4). Suppose also
that q-acceptant choice functions C˜(·) and C(·) choose following sets of individual from I:
C˜(I) = {i1, i4} and C(I) = {i2, i3}. According to our domination criterion, the sets {i1, i4}
and {i2, i3} do not dominate each other. Therefore, q-responsive choice functions C˜(·) and
C(·) are incomparable with regard to our comparison criterion.25
Given a set of contracts, there might be multiple subsets that satisfy horizontal reserva-
tions in a given vertical category. We use the merit-based domination criteria defined above
to determine which subset of applicants is more meritorious.
Definition 1. A sub-choice rule Csv for vertical category v in institution s is merit-based
undominated if, for every set of contracts X ⊆ X , (1) Csv(X) satisfies horizontal reservations
h(v,s), and (2) Csv(X) is not merit-based dominated by any set Y ⊆ Xv that satisfies horizontal
reservations.
In what follows, we introduce the sub-choice rule Chier that chooses the best set of
25Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a) introduce a different domination criterion to compare two sets of individuals
on the basis of merit. They say that a set of individuals I dominates J if there exists an individual in I \ J
with a merit score that is strictly greater than the merit scores of all individuals in J \ I. Their domination
criterion induces a strict partial order. According to their criterion, in this particular example, the set of
individuals {i1, i4} dominates {i2, i3}, since the former set contains the highest score student i1 while the
latter does not. However, we believe that the comparison between {i1, i4} and {i2, i3} is rather ambiguous.
Our domination criteria is not able to compare sets on the basis of merit when there is such ambiguity. Also,
the following is an important consideration: In India, when applicants have the same merit score, ties are
broken with some pre-determined criteria. Suppose that candidates’ test scores are as follows: κ(i1) = 100,
κ(i2) = 100, κ(i3) = 99, and κ(i4) = 20. Suppose that tie between i1 and i2 is broken in a way that favors
candidate i1. Applying Sönmez and Yenmez’ s (2019a) criterion leads to the conclusion that {i1, i4} is a
better set of applicants than {i2, i3}. However, considering merit scores, {i2, i3} is not dominated by {i1, i4}.
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candidates that satisfy horizontal reservations from any given set of contracts.26
Sub-choice rule Chier and Its Properties
We describe the sub-choice rule Chier for vertical category v ∈ T and horizontal reservations
h(v,s). Suppose X ⊆ X is offered to institution s. Then, Xv ⊆ X is the set of contracts
associated with vertical category v. Let i(Xv) be the set of individuals who have contracts
in Xv.
Step 1: If no individual in i(Xv) has any horizontal type, then choose contracts of in-
dividuals with the highest merit scores for all seats. Otherwise, for every horizontal type
hj that does not contain any other horizontal type, choose the contracts of highest-scoring
individuals up to the capacity. Adjust the number of available seats and the number of
horizontal reservations for any horizontal type that contains hj by the number of chosen
contracts. Adjust the number of remaining seats and the number of horizontal reservations
of the horizontal types that contain hj. Eliminate hj from the set of horizontal types. If
there are no individuals or seats left, end the process and return the chosen set of contracts.
Step n (n≥2): If there is no horizontal type left to be considered, then choose contracts
of individuals following the merit score ranking for the remaining seats. Otherwise, for every
horizontal type hj that does not contain any other remaining horizontal type, choose the
contracts of highest-scoring individuals up to the adjusted capacity. Adjust the number
remaining seats and the number of horizontal reservations for any horizontal reservation
that contains individuals with hj. Eliminate hj from the set of horizontal reservations to be
considered. If there are no individuals or seats left, the process ends and returns the chosen
set of individuals.
We are now ready to present our first main result:
Theorem 1. Chier is the unique choice rule that is merit-based undominated.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In other words, a choice rule is merit-based undominated if and only if it is Chier. Theorem
1 normatively justifies the use of the sub-choice rule Chier at each vertical category.
26We describe the sub-choice rule Chier formally in the Appendix A.
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4.2 Overall Choice Rules: Incorporating Vertical and Horizontal
Reservations with OBC de-reservations
The reservation policy in India is implemented in a lot of different admissions and recruiting
processes at the national level in publicly funded educational institutions and government
job positions. In some admission processes, such as admissions to technical universities,
vacant OBC seats are required to be provided for the use of GC candidates. In some others,
vacant OBC seats remain vacant. In this section, we integrate the sub-choice function Chier
with three different OBC de-reservation policies to define three different institutional choice
procedures.
1. Choice Rule without Reverting Surplus OBC Seats to GC
In applications where vacant OBC seats are not allowed to be utilized by other applicants,
we design a choice rule by applying Chier in both steps of a two-step procedure to allocate
GC seats in the first step and reserved category seats in the second step. We refer to this
choice rule CV Hw/oT , i.e., the choice rule under vertical and horizontal reservations without
transfers.
Choice Rule CV Hw/oTs
Step 1: In this step, consider only contracts associated with GC. Use Chier(· | vGCs , h(GC,s))
to select contracts. Remaining contracts of selected individuals are removed for the rest of
the process.
Step 2: For each reserve eligible category v ∈ V , consider only the contracts with term v.
Then, for each category v, apply Chier(· | vvs , h(v,s)) to the contracts with term v.
2. Choice Rule with Transfers from OBC to GC
We now introduce a choice rule in which all vacant OBC seats are reverted to GC. The first
two steps of this new choice rule are as same as the choice rule. However, this new choice
rule has an additional third step. In the third step, all of the seats reverted from OBC to
GC are filled with candidates who offer contracts with the GC term. Contracts with SC and
ST terms are not considered in the third step.
22
Choice Rule CV HwTs
Step 1: In this step, consider only contracts with the GC term. Use Chier(· | vGCs , h(GC,s))
to select contracts. Remaining contracts of selected individuals are removed for the rest of
the process.
Step 2: For each reserve eligible category v ∈ V , consider only the contracts with term v.
Then, for each category v, apply Chier(· | vvs , h(v,s)) to the contracts with term v. Remaining
contracts of selected individuals are removed for the rest of the process.
Step 3: Let vOBC→GC be the number of vacant OBC seats at the end of Step 2. Consider
only contracts with the GC term. Select contracts following the test score ordering up to
the capacity vOBC→GC .
3. Allocating the Surplus OBC Seats via Meritocracy
Many in India argue that vacant OBC seats should be provided to all candidates on the
basis of merit rather than exclusively to GC candidates. Babu (2010), for example, criticizes
OBC de-reservations only to GC applicants as follows:
“...And even if there is a case for converting those seats, how come only one
category (the general category) has monopoly over these surplus seats? If there
are more seats available, then everyone has an equal claim to those. And if the
cut-off mark for the general category is reduced to admit more students to fill the
converted seats, then fairness demands that the same principle be applied to all
the other categories.”
We now introduce a choice rule CV HwT−Merit that differs from the choice rule CV HwT in that
it considers all remaining contracts in the third step. This choice rule allocates seats that
are reverted from OBC in the third step solely based on test scores and ignores the vertical
categories that contracts are associated with. However, if an individual has two contracts
(one with the GC term and another with the reserve eligible type), then the contract with
the GC term is chosen.
Choice Rule CV HwT−Merits
Step 1: In this step, consider only contracts with the GC term. Use Chier(· | vGCs , h(GC,s))
to select contracts. Remaining contracts of selected individuals are removed for the rest of
the process.
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Step 2: For each reserve eligible category v ∈ V , consider only the contracts with term v.
Then, for each category v, apply Chier(· | vvs , h(v,s)) to the contracts with term v. Remaining
contracts of selected individuals are removed for the rest of the process.
Step 3: Let vOBC→Merit be the number of vacant OBC seats at the end of Step 2. Consider
all remaining contracts. Select contracts following the test score ordering up to the capacity
vOBC→Merit. If an individual has two contracts at the beginning of this step, one with the GC
term and another one with a term v ∈ {SC, ST}, then her only GC contract is considered.
In admissions to publicly funded educational institutions and government-sponsored jobs,
when institutions run their assignment procedures independently the match outcome is de-
termined by the choice rule they implement. Therefore, it is crucial that they respect meri-
tocracy to the extent possible, in conjunction with vertical and horizontal reservations and
OBC de-reservations. Our next result shows that all of the three choice procedure we de-
scribed are fair.
Theorem 2. CV Hw/oT , CV HwTs and CV HwT−Merits are fair.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In decentralized admissions to a single institution, the outcome is determined via a choice
rule. In such applications, fairness of choice rules is critical. The failure of the fairness
criterion might cause legal disputes. Theorem 2 justifies the use of CV Hw/oT , CV HwTs and
CV HwT−Merits in the Indian resource allocation problems on the fairness ground.
5 Cumulative Offer Mechanism and Its Properties
A mechanism M(·;C) maps preference profiles P = (Pi)i∈I to matchings, given a profile of
institutional choice rules C = (Cs)s∈S . Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the choice
rules of the institutions are fixed and writeM(P ) in place ofM(P ;C). A mechanismM is
stable (fair) ifM(P ) is a stable (fair) matching for every preference profile P . A mechanism
M is strategy-proof if for every preference profile P and for each individual i ∈ I, there is
no P˜i, such thatM(P˜i, P−i)PiM(P ).
The cumulative offer algorithm is the central allocation mechanism used in the matching
with contracts framework. Here, we provide an intuitive description of this algorithm. We
give a more technical statement in Appendix B.
In the cumulative offer process, individuals propose contracts to institutions in a
sequence of steps l = 1, 2, ... :
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Step 1: Some individual i1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract, x1 ∈ Xi1 . Institution
s(x1) holds x1 if x1 ∈ Cs(x1)({x1}) and rejects x1 otherwise. Set A2s(x1) = {x1}, and set
A2
s′ = ∅ for each s
′ 6= s(x1); these are the sets of contracts available to institutions at the
beginning of Step 2.
Step l: Some individual il ∈ I, for whom no contract is currently held by any institution,
proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected, xl ∈ Xil . Institution
s(xl) holds the contract in Cs(xl)(Al
s(xl)
∪{xl}) and rejects all other contracts in Al
s(xl)
∪{xl};
institutions s′ 6= s(xl) continue to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step l− 1 . Set
Al+1
s(xl)
= Al
s(xl)
∪ {xl} and set Al+1
s′ = A
l
s′ for each s
′ 6= s(xl).
If at any time no individual is able to propose a new contract—that is, if all individuals
for whom no contracts are on hold have proposed all contracts they find acceptable—then
the algorithm terminates. The outcome of the cumulative offer process is the set of contracts
held by institutions at the end of the last step before termination. In the cumulative offer
process, individuals propose contracts sequentially. Institutions accumulate offers, choosing
a set of contracts at each step (according to Cs) to hold from the set of all previous offers.
The process terminates when no individual wishes to propose a contract.
We are now ready to present our first result in this section.
Theorem 3. The COM with respect to the CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit choice rules
is fair.
Proof. See Appendix.
In centralized admissions to institutions, fairness of outcomes are crucial. In India, there
are numerous court cases due to fairness violations both in admissions to publicly funded
educational institutions and allocation of government-sponsored jobs. Theorem 3 justifies
the use of COM as an allocation mechanism, under the choice rules CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and
CV HwT−Merit, with respect to fairness.
Our next result states that the COM gives the correct incentives to applicants and is also
stable. It is a weakly dominant strategy for individuals to report their vertical category and
preferences over institution-vertical category pairs truthfully.
Theorem 4. The COM with respect to CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit choice rules is
stable and strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Respecting Improvements
It is crucial in meritocratic assignment systems that an increase in an applicants’ merit scores
does not result in a penalty. This natural property is known as respect for improvements
(Balinski and Sönmez, 1999), which is one of the main desiderata of allocation mechanisms,
especially in meritocratic systems.
For each vertical category v ∈ V , individuals are prioritized by removing individuals who
do not qualify for vertical category v and using the merit-score function κ. In the context
of Indian resource allocation problems, all institutions prioritize individuals following the
merit-score function κ within each vertical category. In what follows, we define a notion of
improvement with respect to merit-score functions.
Definition 2. We say that merit-score function κ˜ is an improvement over merit-score func-
tion κ for individual i ∈ I if
1. κ˜(i, s) ≥ κ(i, s) for all institutions s ∈ S, and,
2. there exists an institution s′ ∈ S such that κ˜(i, s′) > κ(i, s′), and,
3. κ˜(j, s) = κ(j, s) for all j 6= i and s ∈ S.
That is, κ˜ is an improvement over κ for individual i if κ˜ is obtained from κ by increasing
i’s merit scores at some institutions while leaving other individuals’ merit scores at every
institution unchanged. By slightly abusing notation, we let C˜(·, κ˜) and C(·, κ) denote vec-
tors of institutions’ overall choice rules obtained from the merit-score functions κ˜ and κ,
respectively.
Definition 3. A mechanism ϕ respects for improvements for i ∈ I if for any preference
profile P ∈ ×i∈IP i
ϕi(P ; C˜(·, κ˜))Riϕi(P ;C(·, κ))
whenever κ˜ is an improvement over κ for i. We say that ϕ respects improvements if it
respects for improvements for each individual i ∈ I.
Theorem 5. The COM with respect to CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit choice rules
respects for improvements.
Proof. See Appendix.
One of the main desiderata for assignment procedures in India is the respect for meri-
tocracy. Therefore, individuals should not have any incentive to try to lower their standings
in institutions’ priority orderings. Theorem 5 states that the COM under CV Hw/oT , CV HwT ,
and CV HwT−Merit achieves this goal.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we model matching markets for publicly funded educational institutions and
government-sponsored jobs in India with comprehensive affirmative action programs. The
laws do not provide a specific method to implement horizontal reservations when individu-
als qualify for multiple horizontal reservation types. We design a sub-choice function that
integrates meritocracy and hierarchical horizontal reservations to be implemented in each
vertical category. Our sub-choice function selects the best set of individuals that satisfy
horizontal reservations with respect to a comparison criteria we define.
We design three different choice rules for institutions that incorporate different OBC
de-reservation policies. By embedding these choice rules in the COM, we offer matching
mechanisms that (1) respect vertical reservations at each institution, (2) respect horizontal
reservations within each vertical category at each institution, (3) respect meritocracy to
the extent possible, (4) take OBC de-reservations into account, and (5) consider applicants’
preferences for both institutions and the category through which they are admitted under.
We show that the COM is stable with respect to institutions’ choice rules, strategy-proof for
applicants, and respects improvements.
7 Appendices
A. Formal Description of Chier
We describe the sub-choice rule Chier for vertical category v ∈ T . Let X ⊆ X be the set of
contracts offered to institution s. Remove all contracts in X \Xv. Let hs = h1s = (h
1
(v,s))v∈T
denote the horizontal reservation of institution s, where
h
1
(v,s) ≡ (h
(j,1)
(v,s))hj∈H
is the vector of horizontal reservations at vertical category v ∈ T . In each step of Chier the
number of horizontal reservations is updated.
Let
H1 = {hj ∈ H | ∃hk ∈ H such that ρ−1(hk) ⊂ ρ−1(hj)}
be the set of horizontal reservation types that does not contain another horizontal reservation
type.
Step 1: If no individual has any horizontal reservation, then choose the contracts of in-
dividuals with the highest merit scores for all seats. Otherwise, for every horizontal type
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hj ∈ H1, if there are less than h(j,1)(v,s) individuals, choose contracts of all of them. Otherwise,
choose the contracts of the h(j,1)(v,s) highest-scoring individuals with horizontal reservation hj.
Reduce the number of available seats and the number of horizontal reservations for any
horizontal type that contains hj by the number of chosen contracts. Eliminate hj from the
horizontal types to be considered and set
H2 ≡ {hj ∈ H \ H1 | ∃hh ∈ H \ H1 such that ρ−1(hk) ⊂ ρ−1(hj)}.
If there are no individual or seats left, end the process and return the chosen set of contracts.
Let h2s = (h
2
(v,s))v∈T denote the updated numbers of horizontal reservations for Step 2,
where
h
2
(v,s) ≡ (h
(j,2)
(v,s))hj∈H\H1
is the updated number of horizontal reservations for horizontal types that have not yet been
considered.
Step n (n≥2): If there is no horizontal type left to be considered, then choose contracts
of individuals following the merit score ranking for the remaining seats. Otherwise, for
every horizontal type hj ∈ Hn, if there are less than h(j,n)(v,s) individuals in the remaining set,
choose contracts of all of them. Otherwise, choose the contracts of the h(j,n)(v,s) highest-scoring
individuals with horizontal reservation hj. Reduce the number of available seats and the
number of horizontal reservations for any horizontal type that contains hj by the number of
chosen contracts. Eliminate hj from the set of horizontal reservations to be considered and
set
Hn+1 ≡ {hj ∈ H \ (
n∪
r=1
Hr) | ∃hh ∈ H \ (
n∪
r=1
Hr) such that ρ−1(hk) ⊂ ρ−1(hj)}.
If there are no individuals or seats left, the process ends and returns the chosen set of
individuals.
Let hn+1s = (h
n+1
(v,s))v∈T denote the updated numbers of horizontal reservations for Step
(n+ 1), where
h
n+1
(v,s) ≡ (h
(j,n+1)
(v,s) )hj∈H\(
n∪
r=1
Hr).
B. Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
The cumulative offer process (COP) associated with proposal order Γ is defined by the
following algorithm.
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1. Let l = 0. For each s ∈ S, let D0s ≡ ∅, and A1s ≡ ∅.
2. For each l = 1, 2, ...
Let i be the Γl − maximal individual i ∈ I, such that i /∈ i( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) and max
P i
(X \
( ∪
s∈S
Als))i 6= ∅i—that is, the first individual in the proposal order who wants to propose
a new contract, if such an individual exists. (If no such individual exists, then proceed
to Step 3 below.)
(a) Let x = max
P i
(X \ ( ∪
s∈S
Als))i be i’s most preferred contract that has not been pro-
posed.
(b) Let s = s(x). Set Dls = Cs(Als ∪ {x}) and set Al+1s = Als ∪ {x}. For each s′ 6= s,
set Dl
s′ = D
l−1
s′ and A
l+1
s′ = A
l
s′ .
3. Return the outcome
Y ≡ ( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) = ( ∪
s∈S
Cs(Als)),
which consists of contracts held by institutions at the point when no individuals want
to propose additional contracts.
Here, the sets Dl−1s and Als denote the set of contracts held by and available to institution
s at the beginning of the cumulative offer process step l. We say that a contract z is rejected
during the cumulative offer process if z ∈ Als(z) but z /∈ Dl−1s(z) for some l.
C. Monotone Capacity Transfers
Monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes requires that (1) whenever weakly more slots are
left unfilled in every vertical category preceding the jth vertical category, weakly more slots
should be available for the jth vertical category, and (2) an institution cannot decrease its
total capacity in response to increased demand for some vertical categories.
The overall choice rule CV Hw/oT trivially has monotonic capacity transfer scheme as
no capacity is transferred across vertical categories. It is straightforward to see that the
overall choice rule CV HwT has monotonic capacity transfer. The processing order of vertical
categories is Open-SC-ST-OBC-Open and the only capacity transfer occur between OBC
and the last category Open. All of the remaining vacant OBC seats are transferred to Open
category. This basic scheme satisfies both of the requirements of monotone capacity transfer
given above.
The processing order of vertical categories for the overall choice rule CV HwT−Merit is
Open-SC-ST-OBC-Merit. The last category selects contracts with respect to merit score
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and is vertical category free. If a candidate have two contracts, the contract with the GC is
chosen. The only capacity transfer occur between OBC and the last category Merit. All of
the remaining vacant OBC seats are transferred to Merit. This basic scheme satisfies both
of the requirements of monotone capacity transfer given above, as well.
D. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the following problem with a single institution
S = {s}, and two individuals I = {i, j}. There are two vertical categories, SC and GC. In-
stitution s has two positions. One of them is reserved for SC applicants and the other one is
an open category position. If open category position remains empty, its capacity is not trans-
ferred to SC. Suppose that both i and j have vertical category SC. Let X = {x1, x2, y1, y2},
where i(x1) = i(x2) = i, i(y1) = i(y2) = j, t(x1) = t(y1) = GC, and t(x2) = t(y2) = SC.
Suppose that individuals have the following preferences: x2Pix1 and y2Pjy1. Individual i has
higher merit score than individual j at institution s, i.e., κ(i, s) > κ(j, s). Let Cs be one
of the three overall choice rule we described in Section 4, i.e., Cs is a fair choice rule. Note
that Cs fills the open category position first and then fills the SC position.
The allocation Y = {x1, y1} is fair but not stable with respect to Cs because Y is blocked
via {y2}. That is, Cs{x1, y1, y2} = {x1, y2}. On the other hand, the allocation Z = {x1, y2}
is stable with respect to Cs but not fair because individual i envies j’s assignment.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that Chier is merit-based undominated. Since each
individual can have at most one contract with a given vertical category, we consider a set of
individuals rather than a set of contracts for a given vertical category.
Toward a contradiction, suppose that Chier is merit-based dominated. Then, for some
X ⊆ X , there exists Y ⊆ X, such that i(Y ) merit-based dominates i(Chier(X)). Let
Î1 = i(C
hier(X))\ i(Y ) and Ĵ = i(Y )\ i(Chier(X)). For each i ∈ Î1, let ni be the step in Chier
at which i is chosen. Define n̂1 = min
i∈Î1
ni. Let iˆ1 be the highest-scoring individual among
individuals i ∈ Î1 with ni = n̂1. Consider the horizontal type ĥ1 in which î1 is chosen. Since
i(Y ) merit-based dominates i(Chier(X)), it must be the case that i(Y ) satisfies horizontal
reservations. Since the set of chosen individuals before Step n̂1 is also in the set i(Y ),
and Chier selects top-scoring individuals within each horizontal type, to fill the remaining
positions, given that i(Y ) does not contain î1, there exists at least one individual in i(Y ),
who has the horizontal type ĥ1 and whose score is lower than that of î1. Among those, let
ĵ1 be the highest-scoring individual. The set i(Y ) ∪ {ˆi1} \ {jˆ1} = I˜1 merit-based dominates
i(Y ).
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Let Î2 = Î1 \ {ˆi1}. For each i ∈ Î2, let ni denote the step in Chier at which i is chosen.
Define n̂2 = min
i∈Î2
ni. Let î2 be the highest-scoring individual among individuals i ∈ Î2 with
ni = n̂2. Consider the horizontal type ĥ2 in which î2 is chosen. Since the set of chosen
individuals before Step n̂2 is also in the set I˜1, and Chier selects top-scoring individuals
within each horizontal type, to fill the remaining positions, given that I˜1 does not contain
î2, there exists at least one individual in I˜1, who has the horizontal type ĥ2 and whose score
is lower than that of î2. Among those, let ĵ2 be the highest-scoring individual. The set
I˜1 ∪ {ˆi2} \ {jˆ2} = I˜2 merit-based dominates I˜1.
We continue in the same fashion. The set i(Y ) ∪ {̂i1, ..., îl} \ {jˆ1, ..., jˆl} = I˜ l merit-based
dominates the set i(Y )∪{̂i1, ..., îl−1}\{jˆ1, ..., jˆl−1} = I˜ l−1. Since the set Î1 is finite, in finitely
many steps, call it m, we reach
i(Y ) ∪ {̂i1, ..., îm} \ {jˆ1, ..., jˆm} = I˜m = i(Chier(X)).
Hence, i(Chier(X)) merit-based dominates i(Y ). This contradicts our supposition. Thus,
Chier is merit-based undominated.
Next, we will show that Chier is the unique merit-based undominated choice rule. Toward
a contradiction, suppose that there is a merit-based undominated choice rule C(·), such that,
for a given set of contracts X ⊆ Xs, Chier(X) 6= C(X). Define Î1 ≡ i(Chier(X)) \ i(C(X)).
Let ni be the step in Chier at which individual i is chosen. Let n̂1 = min
i∈Î1
ni. Among
all individuals with ni = n̂1, call the individual with the highest merit score î1. Consider
the horizontal type ĥ1 in which î1 is chosen. We know that i(C(X)) satisfies horizontal
reservations. Since the set of chosen individuals before Step n̂1 is also in the set i(C(X)),
and Chier selects top-scoring individuals within each horizontal type, to fill the remaining
positions, given that i(C(X)) does not contain î1, there exists at least one individual in
i(C(X)), who has the horizontal type ĥ1 and whose score is lower than that of î1. Among
those, let ĵ1 be the highest-scoring individual. The set i(C(X)) ∪ {ˆi1} \ {jˆ1} = I˜1 merit-
based dominates i(C(X)). This contradict with our supposition that i(CX)) is merit-based
undomianted. Thus, there is no other merit-based undominated choice rule than Chier.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove Theorem 2 for a given institution s ∈ S.
(i) We first show that Chier is fair for any given vertical type. Toward a contradiction,
suppose that Chier is not fair. Then, there exists a set of contracts Xs and a pair of contract
x, y ∈ Xs such that x /∈ Chier(Xs), y ∈ Chier(Xs), κ(i(x), s) > κ(i(y), s), and t(x)×ρ(i(x)) ⊇
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t(y)× ρ(i(y)). Therefore, one can construct a set of contracts Y ⊂ Xs such that
Y = (Chier(Xs) \ {y}) ∪ {x}.
It is easy to see that i(Y ) merit-based dominates i(Chier(Xs)) which contradicts Chier
being merit-based undominated. Hence, Chier is fair.
(ii) We now show that CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit are fair. We start with the
choice rule CV Hw/oT . Toward a contradiction, suppose that CV Hw/oT is not fair. Then, there
exists a set of contracts Xs and a pair of contract x, y ∈ Xs such that x /∈ CV Hw/oT (Xs),
y ∈ CV Hw/oT (Xs), κ(i(x), s) > κ(i(y), s), and t(x) = t(y) = v, and ρ(i(x)) ⊇ ρ(i(y)). Since x
is not chosen by the overall choice rule CV Hw/oT , it must be rejected by sub-choice functions
Chier(· | vv′s , h(v′ ,s)) for all v′ ∈ T , including vertical category v. Therefore, one can construct
a set of contracts Y ⊂ X such that
Y = (Chier(X
′
s | vvs , h(v,s)) \ {y}) ∪ {x},
where X ′s is the set of contracts considered by Chier(· | vvs , h(v,s)). Note that i(Y ) merit-based
dominates i(Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)). This contradicts Chier being merit-based undominated.
We next show that CV HwT is fair. Toward a contradiction, suppose that it is not fair.
Then, there exists a set of contracts Xs and a pair of contracts x, y ∈ Xs, such that x /∈
CV HwT (Xs), y ∈ CV HwT (Xs), κ(i(x), s) > κ(i(y), s), t(x) = t(y) = v, and ρ(i(x)) ⊇ ρ(i(y)).
Since x is not chosen by the overall choice rule CV HwT , it must be rejected by sub-choice
functions Chier(· | vv′s , h(v′ ,s)) for all v′ ∈ T , including vertical category v. Hence, there is a
step of CV HwT and a set of contracts X ′s such that x, y ∈ X ′s, x /∈ Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)) and
y ∈ Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)). One can construct a set of contracts Y ⊂ Xs such that
Y = (Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)) \ {y}) ∪ {x}.
It is easy to see that i(Y ) merit-based dominates i(Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v′,s))). This contradicts
Chier being merit-based undominated. Hence, CV HwT is fair.
Finally, we show that CV HwT−Merit is fair. Toward a contradiction, suppose that it is
not. Then, there exists a set of contracts Xs and a pair of contracts x, y ∈ Xs, such that
x /∈ CV HwT−Merit(Xs), y ∈ CV HwT−Merit(Xs), κ(i(x), s) > κ(i(y), s), t(x) = t(y) = v, and
ρ(i(x)) ⊇ ρ(i(y)). Since x is not chosen by the overall choice rule CV HwT−Merit, it must
be rejected by sub-choice functions Chier(· | vv′s , h(v′ ,s)) for all v′ ∈ T , including vertical
category v. However, it cannot be the case that y is chosen in Step 3 of CV HwT−Merit while
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x is rejected in the same step because in Step 3 contracts are chosen on the basis of merit
scores and κ(i(x), s) > κ(i(y), s). So, either in Step 1 or Step 2 of CV HwT−Merit there is a set
of contracts X ′s such that x, y ∈ X ′s, x /∈ Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)) and y ∈ Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)).
Then, one can construct a set of contracts Y ⊂ Xs such that
Y = (Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s)) \ {y}) ∪ {x}.
Again, it is easy to see that i(Y ) merit-based dominates i(Chier(X ′s | vvs , h(v,s))). This con-
tradicts with Chier being merit-based undominated. Hence, CV HwT−Merits is fair.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, note that choice rules CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit
are in the family of Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), studied in Aygün
and Turhan (2019). Moreover, as shown in Theorem 2, choice rules CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and
CV HwT−Merit are fair. We need to show that the COM with respect to these choice rules are
fair.
Toward a contradiction, suppose that it is not. Then, there must exist a preference
profile P such that the outcome of the COP under preference profile P is not fair. Let X
be the outcome of the COP under preference profile P . Since X is not fair, there must exist
contracts x, y ∈ X such that (s(y), t(y))Pi(x)(s(x), t(x)). Since (s(y), t(y)) is acceptable to
individual i(x), she is eligible for vertical category t(y). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: s(x) 6= s(y). If (s(y), t(y))Pi(x)(s(x), t(x)), then individual i(x) must have of-
fered the contract (i(x), s(y), t(y)) before she offered contract x. The contract (i(x), s(y), t(y))
must have rejected by institution s(y). Moreover, individual i(x)’s all contracts that are as-
sociated with institution s(y) must be rejected. Since choice rules CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and
CV HwT−Merit are fair, we have either κ(i(y), s(y)) > κ(i(x), s(y)) or ρ(i(x)) + ρ(i(y)).
Case 2: s(x) = s(y). Let s(x) = s(y) = s. There are two sub-cases to consider:
Sub-case 2.1. t(y) precedes t(x). Consider the last step of the COP. At this step,
the contract (i(x), s, t(y)) is available to institution s, but is rejected. Then, it must be
the case that either κ(i(y), s) > κ(i(x), s) or ρ(i(x)) + ρ(i(y)) hold. To see why consider
the case where κ(i(y), s) < κ(i(x), s) and ρ(i(x)) ⊇ ρ(i(y)). Lex X be the outcome of the
COP and Xs be the set of contracts assigned to institution s. If we replace the contract
y with (i(x), s, t(y)), the resulting set of contracts (Xs \ {y}) ∪ {(i(x), s, t(x)} merit-based
dominatesXs,27 which is a contradiction because, for every vertical type in CV Hw/oT , CV HwT ,
27Note that ρ(i(x)) ⊇ ρ(i(y)) ensures that (Xs \ {y}) ∪ {(i(x), s, t(x)} satisfies horizontal reservations.
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and CV HwT−Merit, contracts are chosen according to Chier that is merit-based undominated.
Sub-case 2.2. t(x) precedes t(y). We invoke Lemma 1 of Aygün and Turhan (2019).
We first define some key notions. Let XM = {x1, ..., xM} be an observable offer process. We
sayXm = {x1, .., xm}, i.e., Xm are the contracts proposed up to stepm of the observable offer
process XM . We let Ht(Xm) denote the set of contracts available to vertical category t in the
computation of Cs(Xm).28 Let Ft(Xm) = ∪
n≤m
Ht(X
n), i.e., Ft(Xm) is the set of all contracts
that were available to vertical category t at some point of offer process Xm = {x1, ..., xm}.
(iii) of Aygün and Turhan’s (2019) Lemma 1 states that the choices from the F and H sets
are the same for each m at every vertical category, i.e., Ct(Ht(Xm); qmt ) = Ct(Ft(Xm); qmt ).
Consider the last step of the COP. At this step, the contract (i(x), s, t(y)) is available
to institution s, but is rejected. Since the contract (i(x), s, t(y)) was offered at some earlier
step, we have
(i(x), s, t(y)) ∈ Ft(y)(XM).
Since Ct(y)(Ht(y)(XM); qMt(y)) = Ct(y)(Ft(y)(X
M); qMt(y)), we have
(i(x), s, t(y)) /∈ Ct(y)(Ht(y)(XM), qMt(y)).
If the COP outcome X is not fair, then it must be the case that
(i(x), s, t(y)) ∈ Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(XM) ∪ {(i(x), s, t(y))}.
Because, otherwise,
Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(X
M), qMt(y)) \ {y} ∪ {(i(x), s, t(y))}
merit-based dominates Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(X
M), qMt(y)). But, we know that C
hier
t(y) is merit-based un-
dominated.
We know that
Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(X
M); qMt(y)) = C
M
t(y)(Ft(y)(X
M); qMt(y)) ⊆ Ht(y)(XM) ⊆ Ft(y)(XM).
28For the overall choice rule CV Hw/oT , the processing order of the vertical categories are as follows:
Open-C-ST-OBC. For the over all choice rule CV HwT , the processing order of the vertical categories are as
follows: Open-SC-ST-OBC-Open. For the over all choice rule CV HwT−Merit, the processing order of the
vertical categories are as follows: Open-SC-ST-OBC-Merit, where the vertical category “Merit” does not
differentiate vertical categories.
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Therefore, by the IRC of Chiert(y) , we must have
Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(X
M); qMt(y)) = C
M
t(y)(Ht(y)(X
M); qMt(y)) ∪ {i(x), s, t(y)).
This contradicts with
(i(x), s, t(y)) ∈ Chiert(y) (Ht(y)(XM) ∪ {(i(x), s, t(y))}.
Proofs of Theorem 4 and 5. We invoke Theorem 1 of Aygün and Turhan (2019) to prove
our Theorems 5 and 6. We first show that the sub-choice rule Chier satisfies substitutability,
size monotonicity, and quota monotonicity. A choice function C is substitutable if for all
x, y ∈ X, and Y ⊆ X,
x /∈ C(Y ∪ {x}) =⇒ x /∈ C(Y ∪ {x, y}).
A choice function C is size monotonic if Y ⊆ X implies | C(Y ) |≤| C(X) | . A choice rule C
is quota monotonic if for any q, q′ ∈ Z+ such that q < q′ , for all Y ⊆ X,
C(Y, q) ⊆ C(Y, q′), and
| C(Y, q′) | − | C(Y, q) |≤ q′ − q.
Lemma 1. Chier is substitutable, size monotonic, and quota monotonic.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) We first show that Chier is substitutable. Consider a vertical category v and a
set of contracts X ⊆ Xv. Note that each individual in i(X) has only one contract in X.
Suppose that contracts x, y ∈ Xv \ X are such that i(x) = i and i(y) = j. Suppose that
x ∈ Chierv (X∪{x, y}). Let m be the step in Chierv at which x is chosen from the set X∪{x, y}
when horizontal type h is considered. We must show that x ∈ Chierv (X ∪ {x}).
Consider y /∈ Chierv (X ∪ {x, y}), i.e., if individual j’s contract is not chosen. It must
be the case that at each horizontal type that individual j has, individuals who have higher
scores than j fill the capacity. Removing individual j does not change the set of chosen
individuals and updated reservations. Then, contract x will be chosen at Step m in Chierv
when horizontal type h is considered from the set X ∪ {x}.
Now suppose that y ∈ Chierv (X∪{x, y}). There are two cases to consider. In the first one,
y is chosen when horizontal type h′ is considered, where h does not contain h′ and h′ does not
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contain h. In this case, x will still be chosen at Step m in Chierv because removing individual
j from the applicant pool does not change the set of chosen individuals by horizontal types
that are contained by h and their updated capacities.
In the second case, y is chosen when horizontal type h′ is considered, where either h′
contains h or h contains h′ . Suppose that y is considered and chosen at some Step l in
Chierv where l ≥ m. Then, x will still be chosen at Step m in Chierv from X ∪ {x}, because
considering and choosing y at the same or a later stage of Chierv from the set X ∪{x, y} does
not affect the chosen sets prior to Step m from the set X ∪ {x}. Note that the updated
capacities of the horizontal types will be unchanged. Also, the number of individuals who
have higher score than i and considered at Step m does not increase.
Now consider the case where y is chosen from the set X ∪ [x, y} when horizontal type
h
′ is considered, where h contains h′ . That is, y is considered and chosen from the set
X ∪ {x, y} at some Step l in Chierv where l < m. When horizontal type h is considered at
Step m in Chierv for the set X ∪ {x}, the updated number of horizontal reserves at which
individual i is considered is either the same or one more than the updated number of same
horizontal types in the choice process beginning with the contract set X ∪{x, y}. Moreover,
the number of individuals who are considered for the same horizontal types and have higher
score than individual i does not increase. Hence, x will be chosen at Step m of Chier from
the set X ∪ {x}.
(ii) We now show that Chierv is size monotonic. Note that the last step of Chierv
guarantees that Chierv is a q-acceptant choice function. Because, in the last step of Chierv , if
there is no horizontal type left to be considered, contracts are chosen following the merit score
ranking for the remaining seats. It is well-known that q-acceptance implies size monotonicity.
Therefore, Chierv is size monotonic.
(iii) Finally, we show that Chierv is quota monotonic. Consider a set of contracts
X ⊆ Xv. The capacity of vertical category v is vvs . We need to show that Chierv (X, vvs) ⊆
Chierv (X, 1 + v
v
s) and | Chierv (X, 1 + vvs) | − | Chierv (X, vvs) |≤ 1.
We first show that Chierv (X, vvs) ⊆ Chierv (X, 1 + vvs). In the computations of Chierv with
total capacity 1+vvs , the updated capacities of horizontal types at each stage is not lower than
the corresponding updated capacities of horizontal types at each stage in the computation of
Chierv with total capacity vvs . Moreover, the sets of individuals that compete for positions at
each horizontal type at each stage do not expand when the total capacity is increased from
vvs to 1 + vvs . Therefore, if x is chosen in Step m of Chierv when the total capacity is vvs , then
it must be chosen in Stem m (or at an earlier step) of Chierv when the total capacity is 1+vvs .
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We now show that | Chierv (X, 1 + vvs) | − | Chierv (X, vvs) |≤ 1. First, note that Chierv is
an q-acceptant choice function. There are two cases to consider. In the first case, suppose
that all X = Chierv (X, vvs). Then, if the total capacity is increased from vvs to 1 + vvs , by
q-acceptance, we have X = Chierv (X, 1 + vvs). Therefore, we have
| Chierv (X, 1 + vvs) | − | Chierv (X, vvs) |= 0.
For the second case, suppose that Chierv (X, vvs) ⊂ X, which implies | Chierv (X, vvs) |= vvs . Since
all contracts in X are associated with vertical type v, when the total capacity is increase to
1 + vvs , then we have | Chierv (X, 1 + vvs) |= 1 + vvs . Hence, we have
| Chierv (X, 1 + vvs) | − | Chierv (X, vvs) |= 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. We showed in Appendix C that the capacity transfer scheme in
each of CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit is monotonic. Then, by Theorem 1 of Aygün
and Turhan (2019), the COM with respect to CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit is stable
and strategy-proof.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof follows from the Lemma 1 in conjunction with the
monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes in each of CV Hw/oT , CV HwT , and CV HwT−Merit,
and the Theorem 2 of Aygün and Turhan (2019).
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